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Abstract: We use a two-person 3-stage game to investigate whether people choose to punish or
reward another player by sacrificing money to increase or decrease the other person’s payoff.
One player sends a message indicating an intended play, which is either favorable or
unfavorable to the other player in the game.  After the message, the sender and the receiver play
a simultaneous 2x2 game.  A deceptive message may be made, in an effort to induce the
receiver to make a play favorable to the sender.  Our focus is on whether receivers’ rates of
monetary sacrifice depend on the process and the perceived sender’s intention, as is suggested
by the literature on deception and procedural satisfaction. Models such as Rabin (1993), Sen
(1997), and Charness and Rabin (1999) also permit rates of sacrifice to be sensitive to the
sender’s perceived intention, while outcome-based models such as Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
and Bolton and Ockenfels (1997) predict otherwise.  We find that deception substantially
increases the punishment rate as a response to an action that is unfavorable to the receiver. We
also find that a small but significant percentage of subjects choose to reward a favorable action
choice made by the sender.
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21. INTRODUCTION
Notions of fair process and honorable behavior have potentially important
implications for social and economic interaction.  For example, managers and negotiators
often have incentives to mislead others and private information may present the opportunity
for doing so.  Schweitzer and Croson (1999) suggest that “deception in organizations
represents a significant managerial challenge across a broad range of functional areas”.  In
many cases, deception could be used to induce an immediate desired response from a group
of employees.  However, there may be significant limitations to this kind of behavior:  Where
the character of interaction is highly interpersonal in nature, it is important to take into account
the potential impact of social considerations, if only because these may impose bounds on
selfish or dishonest behavior.
These issues may be relevant in the context of the current process of formulating more
accurate theoretical models of human motivation.  The most common assumption in
economics is that people only care about maximizing their own income.  But a large body of
research has shown that many people choose to sacrifice money in laboratory experiments.  A
number of recent formal models presume that people are also motivated by considerations of
altruism, inequality, or reciprocity; while people may nevertheless maximize their utility,
one’s own money is not the sole determinant of utility.  
Pure distributional models, such as Bolton and Ockenfels (1997) and Fehr and
Schmidt (1999), assert that while people may sacrifice money to reduce disparities in material
payoffs, they are unconcerned with the process leading to these payoffs.  On the other hand,
models such as Rabin (1993), Falk and Fischbacher (1998), and Charness and Rabin (1999)
consider the decisions and motives of other agents to be important determinants of behavior.
In a more general vein, Sen (1997) presents a rigorous discussion of process significance and
preference and proposes that “a person’s preferences over comprehensive outcomes
(including the choice process) have to be distinguished from the conditional preferences over
3culmination outcomes given the acts of choice,” where the expression ‘culmination outcomes’
refers to material outcomes.
People may use different kinds of information to infer others’ intentions in a given
situation.  Several experimental studies present data that show how some specific features of
process matter to people.  Subjects sacrifice money to punish others who they feel have acted
in an inappropriate manner and, to a lesser extent, reward generous or favorable actions.
Blount (1995), Charness (1996) and Offerman (1998) find that, in sequential games, second-
mover responses differ according to whether the choice set is believed to be determined by a
self-interested player or by a random mechanism.  Brandts and Solà (1998), Charness and
Rabin (1999) and  Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher (1999) have shown that the nature of foregone
alternatives by the first player significantly affects binary choices by the second player.
These experimental results document the existence of two different types of process
effects.  In this paper we investigate the effects on behavior of another type of process
variable: people’s deliberate misrepresentation of their intended actions.  Our experimental
set-up involved communication between players, where message senders could lie in a self-
serving manner.  The possibility of making deceptive statements and the possibility of people
reacting to the deception (once revealed) in an emotional way are important aspects of social
interaction in many different contexts.  We feel that it is a natural intuition that deception will
be seen by others as a very direct indication of (perhaps overly) selfish intentions and may
lead to substantial process-driven punishment behavior.
  We examine retribution in a sequential two-player experimental game with
communication.1  In our game, after sending a non-binding message about her intended play,
the sender chooses between an action which is clearly favorable and one which is clearly
unfavorable for the receiver.  One of the outcomes gives the sender a much larger payoff than
the receiver. This outcome can be reached via two different paths - the sender may play in
accordance with her message or she may not.  If this outcome is reached, we allow the
4receiver to “punish” by reducing both players’ payoffs to a lower, but equal, level.  If there is
a negative reaction to deception, we should expect (at an unfavorable outcome for the
receiver) a higher punishment rate when the sender has made a misleading message than
when the outcome has been reached after a truthful message.  At another culmination outcome
of our game a receiver can choose to reward a favorable play by the sender by awarding her
money from his own payoff.
We find that many people do send misleading messages and that people do sacrifice
money to both punish and reward.  Punishment rates are significantly higher when there has
been a deceitful message of an intended favorable play, highlighting the importance of
intention and process in one’s dissatisfaction with a culmination outcome.  Finally, the
reward rate is modest but significant.
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 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines retribution as “the dispensing or awarding of
punishment or reward according to the deserts of the individual.”
52.  PREVIOUS ANALYSIS AND EVIDENCE
Material outcomes and payoffs are certainly a crucial factor in determining preferences
and decisions.  Yet,  numerous studies indicate that the process leading to an outcome (or to
one’s choice between outcomes) can also be a key influence.   For example, there is a large
body of work on procedural justice which supports the premise that process satisfaction is an
important ingredient of human motivation.  Thibaut and Walker (1975) and Tyler (1988,
1990) have argued that relational issues may dominate definitions of justice and that
procedural satisfaction may be as important as outcome satisfaction.  Disputant satisfaction is
highest when the process seems fair and when people feel that they have had an opportunity
to be heard (voice), and have had a hand in shaping the outcome.  Evidence from the field is
presented by Kitzmann and Emery (1993), who examine child custody decisions reached
using different methods.  While the fathers almost invariably lost in either case, they felt
much better about the situation when they felt they had been treated reasonably well by the
process.
Perceptions of the fairness of the process are also important for resource allocation in
markets,  negotiations,  and labor relations.  Kahnemann, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986),
Barrett-Howard and Tyler (1986), and Bies, Tripp, and Neale (1993) find that procedural
information influences judgments of market exploitations.  In their survey on fairness in
negotiations, Tripp, Sondak, and Bies (1995) suggest that the allocation of resources may be
of less concern to individual agents than procedural and interactional fairness.  Charness and
Levine (1999) find that the perceived fairness of a layoff is highly dependent on the manner
in which the layoff is implemented.  There is also some evidence that perceived unfairness
can lead to retaliatory behavior.  Robinson and Bennett (1995) examine how employees
respond to violations of the psychological contract and find behavior such as stealing from
the company or co-workers, wasting company resources, lying about hours worked, and
wrongfully blaming co-workers for mistakes.
6Many studies in business ethics and negotiation address the specific issue of
deception and its effects on behavior.  While a satisfied party is more likely to maintain a
positive and productive relationship with others in the environment, violations in
relationships can lead to  negative affect or even moral outrage.  This is particularly true in the
case of lying in negotiations (Anton, 1990; Lewicki, 1983).  Although some feel that
deception is just part of the negotiation “dance,” others (e.g., Shapiro and Bies, 1994)
believe that such behavior can destroy trust and cooperation in ongoing organizational
relationships.  Bies and Tripp (1995) suggest that the harm done to the relationship by lying
may be irreversible.  Schweitzer, Brodt, and Croson (1999) find 36 of 66 “union
negotiators” punish deceptive “city negotiators” when the true state of affairs is revealed and
that distinctions between “types” of deception (e.g., lies of omission or commission) are
important.
Lewicki and Stark (1996) analyze subjects’ evaluations of ethically-questionable
negotiation tactics. Naturally, players’ perceptions of the “game” being played may be
important.  If people expect lies and deception, these may not produce much of a negative
response.  In Roth and Murnighan (1982), disbelief of messages was common.  The stakes
involved may also affect expectations: Tanbrunsel (1998) finds that increased incentives lead
to more misrepresentation and that the greater the incentive one has to engage in
misrepresentation, the more that she expects that an opponent will engage in
misrepresentation.  In addition, her evidence suggests that individuals believe themselves to
be more ethical than their opponents.
Romer (1996) discusses the effects of deception in the political economy context.
According to his analysis, the U.S. social security system was created as an entitlement
program : payroll taxes were bundled with an explicit promise of certain future transfers. The
reason why it is politically very difficult to cut back benefits is that “the act of making, then
breaking, a promise induces a taste for punishing the offender” (Romer, p. 199). In the
7political sphere the punishment would be expressed through people voting against those who
proposed a reduction in benefits.
Our study adds to the analysis of the effects of deception by presenting results from a
simple environment where there is an incentive for misrepresentation and the punishment
mechanism and its monetary consequences are clear.  In our game, false messages are
explicitly permitted, so that it was not clear whether receivers of false messages would judge
these harshly.2  A sender’s willingness to engage in deception reflects her own social values
and her perception of the matched receiver’s social values and willingness to sacrifice money
to punish unethical behavior.  As shall be seen, our design rotates the subjects’ roles (sender
and receiver) and so permits us to examine whether subjects play in a consistent manner
across roles.  If the decision to punish deception is not influenced by whether one has sent
(or intends to send) a false message, punishment could be seen as arbitrary and not based on
underlying social values.  
Our specific focus is on whether a person’s choice between two outcomes is affected
by whether deception has been employed.  Blount (1995), Charness (1996), and Offerman
(1998) have examined whether Player B’s choice to act unfavorably toward Person A
depends on whether an unattractive choice set was reached by Player A’s choice or by
random assignment; other studies cited earlier have examined the effect of alternatives
foregone by Player A on binary choices by Player B.  However, none of these experiments
involve messages or deception.   In addition, we are unaware of any study of the effects of
deception that directly examines the effect of different “paths” to a choice between payoff
pairs on the choice actually selected.  This approach seems closest to the conceptualization in
Sen (1997).
3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES
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 In other environments there may be “rules” against lying, while our environment is very neutral on this
issue.  In this sense, the punishment rates we observe may represent a sort of lower bound.  We were
concerned that no one would send false messages if explicitly discouraged by the instructions.    
8There are 3 stages in our game: the first is the announcement stage, the second is the
simultaneous choice stage and the third is the retribution stage.  The player we will refer to as
the sender chooses an announcement in stage 1 and an action in stage 2.  The player we will
refer to as the receiver observes the sender’s announcement in stage 1, chooses an action in
stage 2 and makes an additional choice in stage 3,  which is described below.  Figure 1
shows the payoff table for the central part of our game:
Figure 1
B 1 B 2
A1 2, 2 6, 9
A2 2, 2 12, 3
 
In the first stage, each person in the sender role sends a costless announcement about
his intended play to an anonymous receiver: the announcement is a non-binding statement
about which choice, A1 or A2, the sender will make in the second stage.  In the second stage,
after the message has been transmitted, both players simultaneously choose actions.  The
sender chooses between A1 and A2 and the receiver chooses between B1 and B2.  In the
third stage, the receiver has an option to change the payoffs if she has played B2.  If (A1,
B2) has been chosen, she can give the sender 2 units (1 unit = $1.50) and so change the
payoffs to (8,7).  If (A2, B2) is the outcome, she can change the payoffs from (12,3) to
9(2,2).  It should be clear that two matched players can reach the (A2, B2) cell by two paths -
one where the message has been A1 and the other where the message has been A2.3 
Our design is motivated by two considerations.  First, we wanted a simple
environment, where the (binary) choices and associated payoffs were transparent to the
players.  The second issue is related to our main objective of working with an environment in
which it is plausible to expect self-serving lies.  In our game we expected many senders’
preferred outcome to be (12,3) and, therefore, their preferred action in the simultaneous
choice stage to be A2.  The receiver, however, may be quite averse to the (12,3) outcome,
given the unequal distribution of payoffs.  Therefore, if the receiver believes that the sender
will choose A2 the receiver’s choice may be B1.  The sender may send the A1 message to
encourage a B2 choice, but then actually play A2.
Given that the punishment payoffs in the retribution stage of the game are (2,2), there
is really no obvious reason for the receiver to choose B1 in the action stage.  If a receiver
prefers a payoff of (2,2) to (12,3) she can always choose this, as a response to an A2 play,
after playing B2.  However,  there may exist plausible explanations for receivers choosing
B1 and so senders may signal A1 before action A2, in an attempt to circumvent B1 play.  The
fact that it is not completely transparent why the sender should expect a B1 choice after a A2
message does not interfere with the analysis we wish to perform: As long as we obtain
sufficient observations of the (A2, B2) cell being reached after A1 and A2 announcements,
we can compare receivers’ behavior in the two cases.
Taking as given the punishment payoffs (2,2) in the retribution stage, let us consider
some other payoff possibilities that could have been chosen for B1 play.  Our conjecture was
that combinations like (3,2), (4,2), etc. would have been less attractive for the receiver than
(2,2), would have made the choice of B1 quite unlikely in the mind of senders and, hence,
would have made false signals rather infrequent.  The same argument applies for payoffs
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 There is a second possibility for false messages in our design.  The sender may announce A2 and then
choose A1, behaving more favorably to the receiver than announced.  A possible rationale for this behavior is
10
such as (2,1) and (2,0).  The possibility that remains are payoffs combinations like (1,2) and
(0,2).  Our feeling was that payoffs of this kind could have made the B1 choice too attractive
for the receiver and kept us from obtaining a sufficient amount of data in the (A2, B2) cell.
The payoff combination we chose has a knife-edge feature which allows us to obtain, at the
same time, a sizeable amount of false statements by A and of B2 choices by B.
If money is the only element in one’s utility function, the only subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium involves actions (A2, B2) without punishment or reward in the third stage; the
message is irrelevant.4  Distributional models of motivation can explain a choice of (2, 2)
over (12, 3), but also presume that the message is irrelevant.  However, while the choice
with either message is between the outcomes of (12, 3) and (2, 2),  a false message and a
truthful message imply different processes.  Some people may resent the tactic of making a
“promise” and breaking it.  This would be reflected in a differential punishment rate for the
two cases.
Following Bolton, Brandts, and Katok (1997), Bolton, Brandts, and Ockenfels
(1998), and Brandts and Charness (1998), each game was played twice, so that each person
was a sender once and a receiver once.  Participants were assured that no two people were
ever paired twice and subjects were not informed about the final outcome of the first play of
the game when they made their decisions for the second play.  This feature allows us to
obtain data from one-shot interactions and gives us the opportunity to examine whether
people played “consistently” in the two decisions made.  Following the two periods, a coin
was tossed to determine which period was used for actual payoff purposes.
An important procedural point is that receivers were not told the decisions actually
made by the senders before they were asked for their choices of whether to punish and
reward.  Instead each receiver (who knew the message she had received) was asked to
designate (after his B2 play) a contingent choice if the sender actually played A1 and a
                                                                                                                                                    
to surprise the receiver in order to elicit the reward.  As will be shown below, we actually observed instances
of this behavior.
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contingent choice if the sender actually played A2.  One obvious advantage of this approach
is that we can obtain a full set of two responses regardless of the sender’s play.  
This strategy method (Selten, 1967) plausibly induces different behavior than does
the standard “direct-response” method.  Roth (1995) mentions on pg. 323 that “having to
submit entire strategies forces participants to think about each information set in a different
way than if they could primarily concentrate on those information sets that may arise in the
course of the game.”  This statement certainly makes sense, but seems most applicable in
complex or unfamiliar environments.  Cason and Mui (1998) and Brandts and Charness
(1998) find that the strategy method does not significantly alter choices.  We are unaware of
any empirical evidence for a significant difference in behavior due to this method in simple
games.5
We conducted our experimental sessions at UC-Berkeley in February and March,
1999.  A total of 118 people participated in exactly one of the 5 sessions.  Average earnings
were around $15, including a $5 show-up fee.  Recruiting was conducted primarily through
the use of campus e-mail lists. An e-mail message that was sent to randomly-selected people
through the Colleges of Letters, Arts, and Sciences provided the bulk of the participants, so
our sessions typically included individuals from a broader range of academic disciplines than
is common in economics experiments.  Since e-mail is used regularly by the vast majority of
Berkeley students, selection bias from this recruiting method should be minimal, at least with
respect to other laboratory experiments.  Instructions are provided in the Appendix.
People met in a large classroom which was divided into two sides. Individuals sat
where instruction packages had earlier been placed and were well-spaced.  During the first
decision task the subjects on one side of the room had the role of senders while the subjects
on the other side were receivers.  For the second decision task these roles were reversed, and
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 Two other Nash equilibrium strategy combinations, both of which presume there is nonpecuniary utility,
consists in the sender playing A1 and B punishing A2 and 1) not rewarding A1 or 2) rewarding A2.
5
 Note that the fact that we elicit contingent choices in stage 3 ensures that no player knows the outcome of
the first play before making a decision in the second play.
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subjects were assured that they were not matched with the same person as in the first
decision.  
4. RESULTS
Table 1 presents a summary of the data, where the notation s(A1) and s(A2) refers to
the A1 and A2 signals. We find that about 1/3 of all A1 messages are false, as they are
followed by A2 play. By punishment we refer to the receiver choosing payoffs (2,2) after an
(A2,B2) realization and by reward to the choice of (8,7) after (A1,B2). We remind the reader
that each receiver was asked to designate separate choices for the case where the sender
actually played A1 and the case where the sender actually played A2.6   
There is a substantial amount of punishment and a modest, but non-zero, reward rate.
The rate of punishment of action A2 is much higher given a false signal. We also find that
overall about 1/6 of the subjects choose to reward a play of A1.  A surprising phenomenon is
that about 1/4 of all people who signal A2 actually play A1; in addition, this sequence is
rewarded at a slightly higher rate than is signaling A1 and playing A1.  Somewhat
reassuringly, 95% of the subjects played B2.7
Table 1 – Data Summary
Decision Proportion Percentage
s(A1) 76/118 64%
s(A2) 42/118 36%
A1 62/118 53%
A2 56/118 47%
s(A1), play A2 25/76 33%
                                                
6
 Thus, there should be 112 total responses to A1 messages and to A2 messages (118 subjects less those 6
who played B1).  However, 3 subjects failed to indicate a response to a hypothetical A2 play and one subject
failed to indicate a response to a hypothetical A1 play.  Thus, there are only 109 total responses to A2 play
and 111 total responses to A1 play.
7
 95% of B players played B2 in each case - 72/76 played B2 after an A1 message, while 40/42 played B2 after
an A2 message. If one interprets the choice of B1 as a pure mistake, note that a 5% “error rate” is not at all
unusual in laboratory experiments.  Of the 6 people who played B1, 4 had received messages of A1. This
behavior is not easy to interpret in terms of purposeful actions, although a possible explanation is that these
receivers were very sure that an A1 statement was a lie. In the presentation of our statistical tests below we
follow up on this interpretation.
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s(A2), play A1 11/42 26%
B1 6/118 5%
B2 112/118 95%
Punish(s(A1), play A2) 19/69 28%
Punish(s(A2), play A2) 5/40 12%
Punish (overall) 24/109 22%
Reward (s(A1), play A1) 10/72 14%
Reward (s(A2), play A1) 9/39 23%
Reward (overall) 19/111 17%
 
We can use the test of the equality of proportions (Glasnapp and Poggio, 1985) to see
if the observed behavior differs across conditions. The Z-statistic reported is the normal
approximation to the binary distribution, defined by the difference between the proportions
divided by the standard error of the difference.
The first row of table 2 shows that, despite the modest number of observations, the
rates of punishment are significantly different depending on whether the message had been
A1 or A2.8  This is support for our primary hypothesis that the process, here gauged
Table 2 – Statistical Tests
Comparison Proportions Z p-value9
Punish (L)
vs.
Punish (NL)
19/69
vs.
5/40
1.83 .03
R(1)
vs.
R(2)
10/72
vs.
9/39
1.23 .22
Actual R(1+2)
vs.
Presumed R(1+2) = 0
19/111
vs.
0/111
4.56 .00
Prob(PL|L)
vs.
3/19
vs. 2.04 .02
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  If we interpret the 6 instances of B1 choices in terms of purposeful behavior the existence of a statistical
difference between the punishment rates goes through. If B1 after A1 is not an error, a reasonable
interpretation of this choice is that B is expecting a lie. In this case the punishment rate after a lie changes to
23/73=31% by adding 4 in the numerator and the denominator. Analogously the punishment rate after truthful
messages changes to 7/42=16%. The test for differences yields Z=1.75 and p=.04 (one-tailed test).
9
 We had directional hypotheses for comparisons 1, 3, and 4, so these p-values reflect one-tailed tests.
However, there was no directional hypothesis regarding reward rates across messages, so this p-value reflects
the two-tailed test.
14
Prob(PL|NL) 21/50
Here L means “lie” or (s(A1), play A2), NL means “not lie” or (s(A2), play A2), PL|L
means a receiver punished a lie if he himself lied as a sender, and PL|NL means a
receiver punished a lie if  he himself didn’t lie as a sender.  R(1) or R(2) means reward
after signal A1 or A2, respectively, followed by an A1 play.
by the accuracy of the message,  affects the choice between culmination outcomes.10  A
deceptive message is not considered to be appropriate by many participants and a substantial
number of these are even willing to sacrifice money to express their displeasure; this suggests
that receivers felt that senders were intending to use a false message in a manipulative way.
The punishment of deceptive statements can also be interpreted in terms of aspiration levels:
When player B gets the message A1 his aspiration level moves to a payoff level of 9.  A
subsequent action A2 gives him a payoff of 3, below his aspiration level, and induces
punishment. 
The second row of table 2 shows that the reward rate is more than 50% higher when
A1 is played after an A2 message, suggesting that people respond more favorably when the
sender shows a favorable change of heart.   While this “surprise effect” seems plausible ex
post, we had no hypothesis to this effect.  The difference in rates is not significant at standard
levels, but is suggestive.  Possibly any such effect could be explained by a feeling of
entitlement once one has received an A1 signal, so that the actual A1 play doesn’t trigger a
reward.  
The test result shown in the third row of table 2 does not pertain to the analysis of the
effects of deception.   Our focus here is on studying the reward of senders taking the
favorable action A1. We feel that the 17% reward rate is much higher than what would have
been obtained if we simply gave B players unilateral power to choose (6,9) or (8,7) and had
no messages, although we do not run this control.  It is rare for subjects in experiments to
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 An argument could be made that the true difference in rates is higher, as the Punish (NL) data may include
some B’s who may have been indifferent to playing B1, except for the small chance of an A1 play.
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choose to receive less than the other player when a choice to receive more is available.11
Here the total social payoff doesn’t even increase.  
Although this is only a hypothetical test, the difference is highly significant (even a
control rate of 10/111 would be significantly less than the observed combined reward rate of
19/111).  We take this result to be evidence of some kind of positive reciprocity.   By that we
mean that Player B is more willing to sacrifice money to increase the payoff of a Player A
who is perceived to have intentionally chosen an action favorable to Player B than to increase
the payoff of a Player A who is perceived to either have had no choice in the allocation or to
have intentionally chosen an action unfavorable to Player B.
In the last row of table 2 we can also see that subjects exhibit a fairly consistent
attitude towards punishment behavior, in the sense that far fewer receivers punish a false
message if they would send it themselves than if not.  Over 40% punish deception, denoted
in table 2 by PL/L, when they don’t use it themselves, compared to 16% otherwise (PL/NL).
This “internal consistency” is an indication that subjects understand the situation and parallels
results such as Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986), where 88% chose to punish a selfish
chooser if one had not been a selfish chooser, but only 31% punished behavior they would
engage in themselves.  Brandts and Charness (1998) and Charness and Rabin (1999) find the
same kind of consistency in behavior across rotated roles.
How do the effective levels of retribution affect players’ material payoffs?  Table 3
shows expected material payoffs for all combinations of message and action.12  If a sender
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 It is easy to prove that, given the parameter specifications in Fehr and Schmidt (1999), no B should prefer
(8,7) to (6,9).  The Bolton and Ockenfels model does not provide a functional form, so we only know that an
individual would compare a mild improvement in the equality of the payoff ratio [from (6/15, 9/15) to (8/15,
7/15)] with the sacrifice of the 2 payoff units.  
12
  Given receivers’ behavior, it appears that material payoffs account only for part of their motivation. The
other part stems from the satisfaction of punishing a self-serving lie and of rewarding a pleasant surprise. It is
conceivable that senders’ payoff are also affected by a non-material component, although this force is more
difficult to gauge; senders’ may derive some satisfaction from sending a truthful message.
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only cares about her own material payoff she should signal A2 and then play A2; it does not
pay to send an A1 message prior to an A2 play. 13
Table 3 – Ex post expected material payoffs
Message, action
Sender
expected
payoff
Receiver
expected
payoff
Combined
expected
payoff
s(A2), A2 10.36 2.84 13.20
s(A1), A2 8.86 2.69 11.55
s(A2), A1 6.23 8.25 14.48
s(A1), A1 6.05 8.38 14.43
On the other hand, a sender with a sufficient positive weight on the receiver’s material
payoff should play A1, as this leads to higher social benefits than A2, regardless of the
signal.  We see (Table 1) that 53% of senders play A1, giving them lower material payoffs ex
post than  would have expected from an A2 play.  While we cannot know precisely why this
choice was made (perhaps an exaggerated fear of punishment), the results suggest this may
reflect pro-social behavior.14
5. DISCUSSION
Previous studies indicate that process satisfaction is a very salient consideration in
many situations.  The negotiation and business ethics literature suggests that deception, while
a fairly common practice,  often induces negative responses.   Generally, people react in an
adverse manner when they feel their right to fair treatment has been violated.  
Our study examines the effect of deception by comparing responses when messages
are honest and when they are not.  In accordance with this view, we find that false messages
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 This result suggests that in a dynamic relationship, false messages would be driven out, since they
ultimately are not in the sender’s interest. However, our focus here is on the study of preferences. For this
purpose what matters are the reactions to false statements, when they are made.
14
 A comparison of the expected payoffs shown in the first and second rows of table 3 reveal the effects, in
economic terms, of the punishment of false messages. If one relates the reductions of sender and receiver
payoffs  to the largest possible reduction from the payoffs shown in the first row of table 3 down to a payoff
of 2, one obtains a fraction of 1.5/8.36 for the sender and of .15/.84 for the receiver.  Both fractions are close
to .18.
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lead to punishment much more frequently than do accurate messages, even though the
choices between culmination outcomes is the same in both cases.  This may be a bit
surprising, since false messages are explicitly permitted in the instructions and there is no
obvious deterrent value for punishment.  We also find that a receiver’s decision regarding
punishing deception is correlated with his behavior as a sender, supporting the view that the
decision to punish is part of a consistent value orientation.  While responses to favorable play
are not our primary focus, we do find that many people donate money in response, choosing
to come out behind; this suggests the presence of positive reciprocity.  
This experiment adds to the literature on process satisfaction/outcome satisfaction by
examining a specific choice between outcomes, when this choice can eventuate through two
different processes.  This simple design highlights the relevance of a person’s beliefs
(influenced here by the message choice) about another individual and provides a clean
illustration (with clear monetary incentives) of the consequences of deception.   The data from
the role rotation indicates that punishment is not simply arbitrary or random.
Punishment has been defined (Kadzin, 1975) as the presentation of an adverse event
or the removal of a positive event following a response.  Romer (1996) suggests that people
can threaten (and impose) punishment for at least two reasons: 1) threats of punishment may
have strategic value (even in the static case) or actual punishment may have future deterrent
value (dynamic case); 2) a person can have a taste of desire for punishing others that is
triggered by a particular sequence of events.  In this case, a person punishes because it is
satisfying to do so. Given the non-repeated nature of our design, there should be no
deterrence motivations  or future financial considerations.  It seems that people simply do not
like being misled and that this triggers a “taste for punishment”, which may be related to self-
respect issues. However, it is also possible that people are willing to provide a public good -
a socially-beneficial “object lesson” to deter further anti-social behavior outside the
laboratory.
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Models such as those in Rabin (1993), Sen (1997), and Charness and Rabin (1998)
offer a role for the perceived intention of an agent and the extent to which an action is
considered socially appropriate.  While pure distributional models such as Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (1997) can explain a B preference for (2,2) over (12,3),
these models consider process and intention irrelevant and so offer no explanation for the
differening punishment rates.  In addition, the non-zero reward rate suggests positive
reciprocity, as evidence and models indicate very few people would otherwise sacrifice
money to come out behind rather than ahead.  
We would like to mention some limitations of our study.  Punishment and reward
decisions are made using the strategy method and may not be the same as would be made
using the direct-response method.   Some may be concerned that the rotation of roles could
affect choices, even though pairings differ across periods.  As is usual in such experiments,
students are the subjects and the stakes are modest.  Yet we provide a comparative test of
punishment rates and so try to compensate for any bias introduced by our methodology.
Further research should focus on identifying the underlying determinants of why
people choose to sacrifice money to punish or reward a person’s behavior.  Given that non-
proscribed misleading messages lead to such a substantial increase in punishment in a one-
shot interaction, one should expect that effects would be larger in an ongoing relationship.
Firms and managers should take heed and avoid deception and similar practices.
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APPENDIX
Instructions
Introduction. Thank you for participating in this session.  The purpose of this session is to
study how people make decisions in a particular situation. Feel free to ask us questions as they
arise, by raising your hand. From now until the end of the session, unauthorized
communication of any nature with other participants is prohibited.
You will receive $5 for participating in this session.  You will receive additional money
for the decisions that are made in the session.  Upon completion of the session the amount you
make will be paid to you in cash. Payments are confidential: no other participant will be told the
amount of money you make.
During the session, you will be paired with another person. However, no participant will
ever know the identity of the person with whom he or she is paired.
Decision task. In each pair, one person will have the role of A, and the other will have the role
of B. The amount of money you earn depends on the decisions you make and on the decisions
of the person with whom you are paired. The decision task consists of three stages and of two
decisions for A and two for B. You will be paired with the same person during the three stages
of the decision task.  The attached figure, also shown on the blackboard, describes the options
available to each person and the associated payoffs.  In stage 1, the person in role A will
announce an intended play for stage 2.  A will announce either A1 or A2; you are not required
to play the move you have announced.  This announcement will be communicated to the
person in role B.  
Then you will move to stage 2 of the decision task: the person in role A will choose a
move between A1 and A2, and the person in role B will choose a move between B1 and B2. At
the end of stage 2 we will communicate to B the choice made by A. The earnings table shown in
the figure under stage 2 exhibits the possible  payoffs at the end of stage 2.
In stage 3, B’s will choose between different options, depending on what has happened
in stage 2.  The final payoffs thus depend on A’s choice between A1 and A2, on B’s choice
between B1 and B2 and on B’s choice in stage 3. In the table shown under stage 3 in the figure,
you can see how B’s choice in stage 3 affects the payoffs of stage 2.
In stage 3, B’s choice will be conditional; that is, if B has chosen B2 in stage 2, B will
now indicate a decision for the case where A has chosen A1 and a decision for the case where A
has chosen A2.  The decision that counts is the one that corresponds to the decision of A.
Conduct of the sessions. You will make your decisions by choosing one of the options available
to you and recording it on a paper form. In stage 1, each A will record the announcement of
A1 or A2 on his or her announcement sheet.  Each B will fill out a no announcement form.  We
will collect all forms for stage 1 and will present each B the announcement of the corresponding
A. Next, A’s and B’s will simultaneously make choices for stage 2 and will record them on their
decision sheets. We will collect these forms and communicate to each B what the corresponding
A chose in stage 2.  B will then make stage 3 decisions.
You will participate in two decision tasks, Task 1 and Task 2. Both tasks are identical to
the description in the previous paragraph. For each task, you will be paired with a different
person. You will have the role of A in one task, and the role of B in the other. First, you will
receive decision forms for the role you have in task 1. You will complete task 1, and all the
forms will be collected. You will then receive decision forms for task 2 and complete task 2.
The results of task 1 will not be revealed prior to completion of task 2.  At the end of the
session, you can learn your results for each decision task.
Payment. You will actually be paid your earnings for just one of the two tasks. The one for
payment will be chosen by a coin flip after both tasks have been completed. We will then call
you one by one to receive your payment, which you will receive privately. Once you are paid
you may leave.
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TASK 1
A’S ANNOUNCEMENT FORM FOR STAGE 1
You have role A.  Please make an announcement of your intended play.  This announcement
will be shown to the B player with whom you are paired.  After B has received the
announcement, you will both simultaneously make your stage 2 choices.  B will be informed
of your choice of moves and will then make a stage 3 choice.
Please indicate your announcement below.
I intend to play:
A 1 A 2
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TASK 1
B’S NO ANNOUNCEMENT FORM FOR STAGE 1
You have role B.  You do not make a decision at this stage.  After you receive A’s
announcement, you will make choices simultaneously.
I understand I do not make an announcement now
________________
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TASK 1
A’S DECISION FORM FOR STAGE 2
You have role A.  Please choose to play either A1 or A2 and indicate your choice below.
I choose to play:
A 1 A 2
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TASK 1
B’S DECISION FORM FOR STAGE 2
You have role B.  Please choose to play either B1 or B2 and indicate your choice below.
I choose to play:
B1 B2
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TASK 1
B’S DECISION FORM FOR STAGE 3
You have role B. If you have chosen B2 in stage 2, please indicate your choice
below.  Your choice is conditional; that is, if you chose B2 before, you will now indicate a
decision for the case where A has chosen A1 and a decision for the case where A has chosen
A2. Please refer to the tables to see which final payoffs would result from your choice.
For the case where A chose A1, I choose to play:
B3 B4
For the case where A chose A2, I choose to play:
     B5              B6
